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Abstract
Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of productivity differences within
industries, and its role in resource allocation. This paper examines the allocational efficiency
of such markets. Productivity differences introduce two new margins of potential inefficiency:
selection of the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across firms.
We show that these considerations impact welfare and policy analysis and market power across
firms leads to distortions in resource allocation. Demand-side elasticities determine how re-
sources are misallocated and when increased competition from market expansion provides
welfare gains.
2
1 Introduction
Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of heterogeneity in firm productivity, and the
constant reallocation of resources across different firms.1 The focus on productivity differences has
provided new insights into market outcomes such as industrial productivity, firm pricing and the
welfare effects of policy changes.2 When firms differ in productivity, the distribution of resources
across firms also affects the allocational efficiency of markets. In a recent survey, Syverson (2011)
notes how the heterogeneity of net social benefits across firms has not been adequately examined,
and this limited understanding has made it difficult to implement policies to reduce distortions (pp.
359). This paper examines allocational efficiency in markets where firms differ in productivity. We
focus on three key questions. First, does the market allocate resources efficiently? Second, what
is the nature of distortions? Third, can economic integration reduce distortions through increased
competition?
When firms are symmetric and markets are imperfectly competitive, efficiency of resource
allocation depends on the trade-off between quantity and product variety.3 When firms differ in
productivity, we must also ask which types of firms should produce and which should be shut down.
Firm differences in productivity introduce two new margins of potential inefficiency: selection of
the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across firms. For example,
it could be welfare-improving to skew resources towards firms with lower costs (to obtain more
output for a given level of resources) or towards firms with higher costs (to preserve variety).
Furthermore, differences in market power across firms lead to new trade-offs between variety and
quantity. We show that these considerations impact optimal policy rules in a fundamental way.
A second contribution of the paper is to show when increased competition improves welfare
and efficiency. When market allocations are inefficient, increased competition may exacerbate
distortions and lead to welfare losses (Helpman and Krugman 1985). A second-best world offers no
guarantee of welfare gains from trade. But, by creating larger, more competitive markets, trade may
1Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Tybout (2003); Feenstra (2006); Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007).
2Pavcnik (2002); Asplund and Nocke (2006); Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001); Melitz and Redding (2012).
3Spence (1976); Venables (1985); Mankiw and Whinston (1986); Stiglitz (1986).
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reduce the distortions associated with imperfect competition and provide welfare gains (Krugman
1987). This insight is even more relevant in a heterogeneous cost environment because of new
sources of potential inefficiency. We explain when integration provides welfare gains by aligning
private and social incentives, and when these gains are higher than in a world with symmetric
firms.4
To understand efficiency in general equilibrium, we examine resource allocation in the standard
setting of a monopolistically competitive industry with heterogeneous firm productivity and free
entry (e.g. Melitz 2003). We begin our analysis by considering constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) demand. In this setting, we show that market allocations are efficient, despite differences in
firm productivity. This is striking as it requires the market to induce optimal resource allocations
across aggregate variety, quantity and productivity. As in symmetric firm models, there are two
sources of potential inefficiency: the inability of firms to appropriate the full consumer surplus and
to account for business stealing from other firms. CES demand uniquely ensures that these two
externalities exactly offset each other. Firm heterogeneity does not introduce any new distortions
because the magnitude of these externalities does not vary across firms. Each firm, however,
charges a price higher than its average cost of production. When productivity differs, the market
requires prices above average costs to induce firms to enter and potentially take a loss. Free entry
ensures the wedge between prices and average costs exactly finances sunk entry costs, and positive
profits are efficient. Therefore, the market implements the first-best allocation and laissez-faire
industrial policy is optimal.5
What induces market efficiency and how broadly does this result hold? We generalize the de-
mand structure to the variable elasticity of substitution form of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). When
demand elasticity varies with quantity and firms vary in productivity, markups vary within a mar-
4International integration is equivalent to an expansion in market size (e.g., Krugman 1979). As our focus is on
efficiency, we abstract from trade frictions which introduce cross-country distributional issues.
5Melitz (2003) considers both variable and fixed costs of exporting. The open Melitz economy is efficient, even
with trade frictions. In the presence of fixed export costs, the firms a policymaker would close down in the open
economy are exactly those that would not survive in the market. However, a policymaker would not close down firms
in the absence of export costs. Thus, the rise in productivity following trade provides welfare gains by optimally
internalizing trade frictions.
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ket. In monopolistic competition models, this generalization simultaneously generates the stylized
facts that firms are rarely equally productive and markups are unlikely to be constant.6 Introduc-
ing this empirically relevant feature of variable elasticities turns out to be crucial in understanding
distortions. When elasticities vary, firms differ in market power and market allocations reflect
the distortions of imperfect competition. Nonetheless, we show that the market maximizes real
revenues. This is similar to perfect competition models, but now market power implies private
benefits to firms are perfectly aligned with social benefits only under CES demand. More gener-
ally, the appropriability and business stealing effects need not exactly offset each other, and firm
heterogeneity introduces a new source of potential inefficiency. When firms differ in productivity,
entry of an additional variety has different business stealing effects across the entire distribution of
firms and induces distortions relative to optimal allocations.
The pattern of distortions is determined by two elasticities: the demand elasticity, which mea-
sures market incentives through markups, and the elasticity of utility, which measures social in-
centives through a firm’s contribution to welfare. We show that the way in which these incentives
differ characterizes the precise nature of misallocations. This also yields two new insights re-
lating productivity differences to misallocations. First, differences in market power across firms
imply that misallocations are not uniform: some firms over-produce while others under-produce
within the same market. For instance, the market may favor excess entry of low productivity firms,
thereby imposing an externality on high productivity firms which end up producing too little. Sec-
ond, differences in market power impact economy-wide outcomes. The distribution of markups
affects ex ante profitability, and therefore the economy-wide trade-off between aggregate quantity
and variety. This is in sharp contrast to symmetric firm markets, where markups (or demand elas-
ticities) do not matter for misallocations, as emphasized by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Vives
(2001). Differences in productivity underline the importance of demand elasticity for allocational
6CES demand provides a useful benchmark by forcing constant markups that ensure market size plays no role in
productivity changes. However, recent studies find market size matters for firm size (Campbell and Hopenhayn 2005)
and productivity dispersion (Syverson 2004). Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) show that “profitability” rather
than productivity is more important for firm selection, suggesting a role for richer demand specifications. For further
discussion, see Melitz and Trefler (2012).
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efficiency, and complement the message of Weyl and Fabinger (2012) and Parenti, Ushchev, and
Thisse (2017), that richer demand systems enable a better understanding of market outcomes.
As misallocations vary by firm productivity, one potential policy option that does not require
firm-level information is international integration. The idea of introducing foreign competition to
improve efficiency goes back at least to Melvin and Warne (1973). We show that market integra-
tion always provides welfare gains when private and social incentives are aligned, which again is
characterized by the demand elasticity and the elasticity of utility. This result ties the Helpman-
Krugman characterization of gains from trade to the welfare approach of Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz.
Symmetric firm models with CES demand provide a lower bound for the welfare gains from in-
tegration. Gains from trade under aligned preferences are higher due to selection of the right
distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across firms. International integration
therefore has the potential to reduce the distortions of imperfectly competitive markets.
Related Work. Our paper is related to work on firm behavior and welfare in industrial orga-
nization and international economics. As mentioned earlier, the trade-off between quantity and
variety occupies a prominent place in the study of imperfect competition. We contribute to this
literature by studying these issues in markets where productivity differences are important. To
highlight the potential scope of market imperfections, we consider variable elasticity of substitu-
tion (VES) demand. In contemporaneous work, Zhelobodko et al. (2012) demonstrate the richness
and tractability of VES market outcomes under various assumptions such as multiple sectors and
vertical differentiation.7 The focus on richer demand systems is similar to Weyl and Fabinger
(2012) who characterize several industrial organization results in terms of pass-through rates. Un-
like these papers, we examine the efficiency of market allocations, so our findings depend on both
the elasticity of utility and the demand elasticity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper to show that market outcomes with heterogeneous firms are first-best under CES demand.8
7While VES utility does not include the quadratic utility of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and the translog utility of
Feenstra (2003), Zhelobodko et al. show it captures the qualitative features of market outcomes under these forms of
non-additive utility.
8We consider this to be the proof of a folk theorem which has been “in the air.” Matsuyama (1995) and Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz (2006) find the market equilibrium with symmetric firms is socially optimal only when prefer-
ences are CES. Epifani and Gancia (2011) generalize this to multiple sectors while Eckel (2008) examines efficiency
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The findings of our paper are also related to a tradition of work on welfare gains from trade.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Dixit and Norman (1988) examine when trade is beneficial
under imperfect competition. We generalize their findings and link them to model primitives of
demand elasticities, providing new results even in the symmetric firm literature. In recent influen-
tial work, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012); Arkolakis et al. (forthcoming) show
that richer models of firm heterogeneity and variable markups are needed for these microfoun-
dations to affect the mapping between trade data and welfare gains from trade. In line with this
insight, we generalize the demand structure and show that firm heterogeneity and variable markups
matter for both welfare gains and allocational efficiency.9 As in Melitz and Redding (2013), we
find that the cost distribution matters for the magnitude of welfare gains from integration. Building
on Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), de Blas and Russ (2010) also examine the role of
variable markups in welfare gains but do not consider efficiency. We follow the direction of Tybout
(2003) and Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2009), which suggest the need to map productivity gains
to welfare and optimal policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps the standard monopolistic competition
framework with firm heterogeneity. Section 3 contrasts efficiency of CES demand with ineffi-
ciency of VES demand and Section 4 characterizes the distortions in resource allocation. Section
5 examines the welfare gains from integration and Section 6 concludes.
when firms affect the price index. Within the heterogeneous firm literature, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) and
Feenstra and Kee (2008) discuss certain efficiency properties of the Melitz economy. In their working paper, Atkeson
and Burstein (2010) consider a first order approximation and numerical exercises to show productivity increases are
offset by reductions in variety. We provide an analytical treatment to show the market equilibrium implements the un-
constrained social optimum. Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2013) consider the constrained social optimum. Their
approach differs because the homogeneous good fixes the marginal utility of income. Our work is closest to Feenstra
and Kee who focus on the CES case. Considering 48 countries exporting to the US in 1980-2000, they also estimate
that rise in export variety accounts for an average 3.3 per cent rise in productivity and GDP for the exporting country.
9For instance, linear VES demand and Pareto cost draws fit the gravity model, but firm heterogeneity still matters
for market efficiency. More generally, VES demand is not nested in the Arkolakis et al. models and does not satisfy a
log-linear relation between import shares and welfare gains, as illustrated in the Online Appendix.
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2 Model
We adopt the VES demand structure of Dixit and Stiglitz within the heterogeneous firm framework
of Melitz. Monopolistic competition models with heterogeneous firms differ from earlier models
with product differentiation in two significant ways. First, costs of production are unknown to firms
before sunk costs of entry are incurred. Second, firms are asymmetric in their costs of production,
leading to firm selection based on productivity. This section lays out the model and recaps the
implications of asymmetric costs for consumers, firms and equilibrium outcomes.
2.1 Consumers
We explain the VES demand structure and then discuss consumer demand. The exposition for
consumer demand closely follows Zhelobodko et al. (2012) which works with a similar setting and
builds on work by Vives (2001).
An economy consists of a mass L of identical workers, each endowed with one unit of labor
and facing a wage rate w normalized to one. Workers have identical preferences for a differentiated
good. If the subset of horizontally differentiated varieties available to them is [0,N], and the worker
chooses quantity qi of variety i ∈ [0,N] her utility takes the general VES form:
U(q)≡
∫ N
0
u(qi)di (1)
where u(·) satisfies Assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1. Utility Restrictions.
1. (Regularity) u is strictly increasing, concave, four times continuously differentiable, satisfies
Inada conditions and u(0) = 0.
The concavity of u ensures consumers love variety and prefer to spread their consumption
over all available varieties. Here u(qi) denotes utility from an individual variety i. Under CES
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preferences, u(qi) = q
ρ
i as specified in Dixit-Stiglitz and Krugman (1980).
10
Given prices pi for the varieties, each worker maximizes her utility subject to her budget con-
straint. VES preferences induce an inverse demand p(qi) = u′(qi)/δ for variety i where δ is the
consumer’s budget multiplier. As u is strictly increasing and concave, for any fixed price vector
the consumer’s maximization problem is concave. The necessary condition which determines the
inverse demand is sufficient, and has a solution provided Inada conditions on u.11
Multiplying both sides of the inverse demand by qi and aggregating over all i, the budget
multiplier is δ =
∫ N
0 u
′(qi) ·qidi. The consumer budget multiplier δ will act as a demand shifter and
the inverse demand will reflect the properties of the marginal utility u′(qi). In particular, the inverse
demand elasticity |d ln pi/d lnqi| equals the elasticity of marginal utility µ(qi)≡ |qiu′′(qi)/u′(qi)|,
which enables us to characterize market allocations in terms of demand primitives.
Under CES preferences, the elasticity of marginal utility is constant and the inverse demand
elasticity does not respond to consumption (|d ln pi/d lnqi| = µ(qi) = 1−ρ). When µ ′(qi) > 0,
the inverse demand of a variety becomes more elastic as its consumption increases. The opposite
holds for µ ′(qi) < 0, where the demand for a variety becomes less elastic as its price rises. Zh-
elobodko et al. (2012) show that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(qi) can also be interpreted in
terms of substitution across varieties. For symmetric consumption levels (qi = q), this elasticity
equals the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. For µ ′(q)> 0, higher
consumption per variety or fewer varieties for a given total quantity, induces a lower elasticity of
substitution between varieties. Consumers perceive varieties as being less differentiated when they
consume more, but this relationship does not carry over to heterogeneous consumption levels.
The inverse demand elasticity summarizes market demand, and will enable a characterization
of market outcomes. A policymaker maximizes utility, and is not concerned with market prices.
Therefore, we define the elasticity of utility ε(qi) ≡ u′(qi)qi/u(qi), which will enable a charac-
10The specific CES form in Melitz is U(q) ≡ (∫ qρi di)1/ρ but the normalization of the exponent 1/ρ in Equation
(1) will not play a role in allocation decisions.
11Additional assumptions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium are in a separate note
available online (Dhingra and Morrow 2016b). Utility functions not satisfying inada conditions are permissible but
may require parametric restrictions to ensure existence.
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terization of optimal allocations. For symmetric consumption levels, Vives (2001) points out that
1− ε(q) is the degree of preference for variety as it measures the utility gain from adding a vari-
ety, holding quantity per firm fixed. To arrive at an analogue of the discrete good case, consider
a consumer who ceases to purchase a basket of varieties [0,α]. The consumer loses an average
utility of
∫ α
0 u(qi)di/α per variety not purchased, and saves an average income of
∫ α
0 piqidi/α
per variety. The savings can be used to increase consumption of all other varieties proportion-
ally by
∫ α
0 piqidi/
∫ N
α piqidi, leading to a rise in average utility per variety not purchased of (using
pi = u′(qi)/δ )
∫ N
α
u′ (qi)
[∫ α
0
piqidi/
∫ N
α
piqidi
]
qidi/α = δ
∫ α
0
piqidi/α.
Letting α approach zero gives us an expression for how 1− ε measures the net welfare gain of
purchasing additional variety (here, variety 0): a welfare gain of u(q0) at a welfare cost of δ p0q0 =
u′(q0)q0 by proportionally consuming less of other varieties. Thus 1−ε(q0)= (u(q0)−u′(q0)q0)/u(q0)
denotes the welfare contribution of variety relative to quantity.
We summarize the assumptions for a well-defined consumer budgeting problem in Assumption
2 below.
Assumption 2. Consumer Regularity Conditions.
1. (Bounded Elasticities) The elasticity of utility ε (q) and elasticity of marginal utility µ (q)
are bounded below by m > 0 and above by 1−m < 1.
2. (Non-satiation) supq
{
U (q) :
∫ N
0 piqidi = 1
}
< ∞.
3. (Bounded Expenditure)
∫ N
0 pi (u
′)−1 (pi)di < ∞.
Assumption 2.1 maintains boundedness between aggregate costs, revenues and welfare. As-
sumption 2.2 is automatically satisfied if u is bounded, but more broadly is an assumption that the
prices faced by a consumer do not allow consumers to attain infinite welfare conditional on the
distribution of prices, for instance if many goods have prices close to zero. Assumption 2.3 is a
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condition that guarantees that the prices presented to consumers imply finite expenditure. Assump-
tions 2.2 and 2.3 will be ensured in equilibrium once firm behavior is considered. We turn to the
firms’ production and entry decisions in the next sub-section.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of firms which may enter the market for differentiated goods, by paying a
sunk entry cost of fe > 0. The mass of entering firms is denoted by Me. Firms are monopolistically
competitive and each firm produces a single unique variety. A firm faces an inverse demand of
p(qi) = u′(qi)/δ for variety i. It acts as a monopolist of its unique variety but takes aggregate
demand conditions δ as given. Upon entry, each firm receives a unit cost c ≥ 0 drawn from a
distribution G with continuously differentiable pdf g. Each variety can therefore be indexed by the
unit cost c of its producer.
After entry, should a firm produce, it incurs a fixed cost of production f > 0. Profit max-
imization implies that firms produce if they can earn non-negative profits net of the fixed costs
of production. A firm with cost draw c chooses its quantity q(c) to maxq(c)[p(q(c))− c]q(c)L and
q(c)> 0 if pi(c)=maxq(c)[p(q(c))−c]q(c)L− f > 0. To ensure the firm’s quantity FOC is optimal,
we assume marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in quantity. Assumption 3 below summarizes
the conditions for a well-behaved profit maximization problem.
Assumption 3. Firm Regularity Conditions.
1. (Decreasing Marginal Revenue) Real revenues u′ (q) ·q are strictly concave in quantity.12
2. (Bounded Costs)
∫ ∞
0 c · (u′)−1 (c)dG(c)< ∞.
Assumption 3.1 guarantees that the monopolist’s FOC is optimal, the quantity choice is de-
termined by the equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost, and that quantities are uniquely
defined for any positive, finite δ . Assumption 3.2 is a condition that guarantees the distribution of
costs in conjunction with demand allows for finite resource usage by a unit mass of firms.
12Inada conditions for revenue are implied by Assumptions 1 and 2.1 since [u′ (q) ·q]′ = u′ (q) [1−µ (q)].
11
A firm chooses its quantity to equate marginal revenue and marginal cost (p+q ·u′′(q)/δ = c),
and concavity of the firm problem ensures that low cost firms supply higher quantities and charge
lower prices. The markup charged by a firm with cost draw c is (p(c)− c)/p(c)=−q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c)).
This shows that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(q) summarizes the markup:
µ(q(c)) = |q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c))|= (p(c)− c)/p(c).
When µ ′(q)> 0, low cost firms supply higher quantities at higher markups.
2.3 Market Equilibrium
Profits fall with unit cost c, and the cutoff cost level of firms that are indifferent to either producing
or exiting from the market is denoted by cd . The cutoff cost cd is fixed by the zero profit condition,
pi(cd) = 0. Firms with cost draws higher than the cutoff level earn negative profits and do not
produce. The mass of producing firms in equilibrium is therefore M = MeG(cd).
In summary, each firm faces a two stage problem: in the second stage it maximizes profits given
a known cost draw, and in the first stage it decides whether to enter given the expected profits in
the second stage. To study the Chamberlinian tradeoff between quantity and variety, we maintain
the standard free entry condition imposed in monopolistic competition models. Specifically, ex
ante average profit net of sunk entry costs must be zero,
∫ cd
0 pi(c)dG= fe. This free entry condition
along with the consumer’s budget constraint ensures that the resources used by firms equal the total
resources in the economy, L = Me
[∫ cd
0 (cq(c)L+ f )dG+ fe
]
.
We will compare the free entry market equilibrium with the socially optimal allocation. In a
separate note, we show that the assumptions defined in terms of model primitives, Assumptions 2.1
and 3, ensure that there is a unique market equilibrium and the quantities produced are continuously
differentiable in costs. In the remainder of this Section, we state the social planner’s problem and
then proceed to a comparison of the market and optimal allocations.
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2.4 Social Optimum
A policymaker maximizes individual welfare U as given in Equation (1) by choosing the mass of
entrants, quantities and types of firms that produce.13 The policymaker can choose any allocation
of resources that does not exceed the total resources in the economy. She faces the same entry
process as for the market: a sunk entry cost fe must be paid to get a unit cost draw from G(c).
Fixed costs of production imply that the policymaker chooses zero quantities for varieties above
a cost threshold. Therefore, all optimal allocation decisions can be summarized by quantity q(c),
potential variety Me and a productivity cutoff cd . Then the policymaker’s problem is to choose
q(c), cd and Me to
max Me
∫ cd
0
u(q(c))dG where L≥Me
{∫ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
.
3 Market Efficiency
Having described an economy consisting of heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive firms, we now
examine efficiency of market allocations. This section starts with a discussion of the potential
externalities in the market and efficiency under CES demand. We then explain market inefficiency
under VES demand.
3.1 Market and Optimal Allocations
Outside of cases in which imperfect competition leads to competitive outcomes with zero profits,
one would expect the coexistence of positive markups and positive ex post profits to indicate in-
efficiency through loss of consumer surplus. Nonetheless, we show that CES demand under firm
heterogeneity exhibits positive markups and ex post profits for surviving firms, yet it is alloca-
tionally efficient. However, this is a special case. Private incentives are not aligned with optimal
production patterns for any VES demand structure except CES.
13Free entry implies zero expected profits, so the focus is on consumer welfare.
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Proposition 1 shows that the market provides the first-best quantity, variety and productivity.
The proof of Proposition 1 differs from monopolistic competition models with symmetric firms
because optimal quantity varies non-trivially with unit cost, variety and cutoff productivity. The
main findings are that the market maximizes aggregate real revenue and that that laissez-faire
industrial policy is optimal under CES demand.
Proposition 1. Under CES demand u(q) = qρ for 0 < ρ < 1 and Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, there is
a unique market equilibrium at which quantities produced are continuously differentiable in costs
and at which it is socially optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that the market allocation is optimal under CES demand, and we now con-
trast the market allocation across symmetric and heterogeneous firms. When firms are symmetric,
resource allocation reflects average cost pricing. Firms charge positive markups which result in
lower quantities than those implied by marginal cost pricing. Even though firms do not choose
prices that equal marginal costs, their market price (and hence marginal utility) is proportional to
marginal cost because markups are constant. This ensures proportionate reductions in quantity
from the level that would be observed under marginal cost pricing (Baumol and Bradford 1970).
These reduced quantity levels are efficient because the marginal utility of income adjusts to ensure
that the ratio of marginal utility to marginal cost of a variety coincides with the social value of
labor (u′(q)/c = δ/(1−µ) = λ ). Free entry equates prices to the average cost of production, and
the markup exactly finances the fixed cost of an additional variety. The market therefore induces
an efficient allocation.
With heterogeneous firms, markups continue to be constant and marginal utility is proportional
to marginal cost. One might infer that enforcing average cost pricing across different firms would
induce an efficient allocation, as in symmetric firm models. But average cost pricing is too low to
compensate firms because it will not cover ex ante entry costs. The market ensures prices are above
average costs at a level that internalizes the losses faced by exiting firms. Entry is at optimal levels
that fix p(cd), thereby fixing absolute prices to optimal levels. Post entry, surviving firms charge
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prices higher than average costs (p(c)≥ [cq(c)+ f/L]/q(c)). Their ex post profits are positive but
the markups exactly compensate them for the possibility of paying fe to enter and then being too
unproductive to survive.
The way in which CES preferences cause firms to optimally internalize aggregate economic
conditions can be made clear through a variety-specific explanation. The elasticity of utility ε(q) =
u′(q) ·q/u(q) can be used to define a “social markup” 1−ε(q). We term 1−ε(q) the social markup
because it denotes the utility from consumption of a variety net of its resource cost. At the optimal
allocation, the multiplier λ encapsulates the social value of labor and the social surplus from a
variety is u(q)−λcq. At the optimal quantity, u′(q(c)) = λc and the social markup is
1− ε(q) =1−u′(q) ·q/u(q) =(u(q)−λcq)/u(q). (Social Markup)
For any optimal allocation, the quantity that maximizes social benefit from variety c solves
max
q
(u(q)/λ − cq)L− f = 1− ε(q
opt(c))
ε(qopt(c))
cqopt(c)L− f .
In contrast, the incentives that firms face in the market are based on the private markup µ(q) =
(p(q)− c)/p(q), and firms solve:
max
q
(p(q)q− cq)L− f = µ(q
mkt(c))
1−µ(qmkt(c))cq
mkt(c)L− f .
Since ε and µ depend only on the primitive u(q), we can examine what demand structures
would make the economy optimally select firms. Clearly, if private markups µ(q) coincide with
social markups 1− ε(q), “profits” will be the same at every unit cost. Examining CES demand,
we see precisely that µ(q) = 1− ε(q) for all q. Thus, CES demand incentivizes exactly the right
firms to produce. Since the optimal set of firms produce under CES demand, and private and social
profits are the same, market entry will also be optimal. As entry Me and the cost cutoff cd are
15
optimal, the competition between firms aligns the budget multiplier δ to ensure optimal quantities.
Efficiency of the market equilibrium in our framework is tied to CES demand. While compar-
ing private and social markups provides a simple way to understand efficiency, this variety-specific
comparison does not explain the general equilibrium forces that induce efficiency. Under symmet-
ric firms, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show there are two externalities that arise in the market.
First, firms cannot capture the entire surplus generated by their production, and this lack of appro-
priability discourages firm entry. This is summarized by the elasticity of utility which measures the
proportion of utility from a variety not captured by its real revenue (1− ε(q) = 1−u′(q)q/u(q)).
Second, firms do not internalize the downward pressure imposed by their production on prices of
other firms, and this business stealing effect tends to encourage too much entry. This externality
is summarized by the inverse demand elasticity µ(q). Under CES demand, the market alloca-
tion is efficient because the appropriability externality balances the business stealing externality
(1− ε − µ = 0) for each variety, and there is no incentive to deviate from optimal entry (Gross-
man and Helpman 1993). When firms differ in productivity, CES demand continues to ensure the
market allocates resources optimally because each variety has the same levels of appropriability
and business stealing. These externalities exactly counteract each other and there are no new dis-
tortions due to firm heterogeneity. More generally, the appropriability externality and the business
stealing externality differ from each other and the magnitude of these effects varies across firms.
To highlight this, we consider the general class of VES demand specified in Equation (1). Direct
comparison of FOCs for the market and optimal allocation shows that constant markups are nec-
essary for efficiency. Therefore, within the VES class, optimality of market allocations is unique
to CES preferences.
Proposition 2. Under VES demand, a necessary condition for the market equilibrium to be so-
cially optimal is that u is CES.
Proof. Online Appendix.
Under general VES demand, market allocations are not efficient and do not maximize indi-
vidual welfare. Lemma 1 shows that the market instead maximizes aggregate real revenue gen-
16
erated in the economy. Defining the real revenue per variety as u′(q)q, aggregate real revenue
(Me
∫ cd
0 Lu
′(q(c)) ·q(c)dG) is maximized for all VES demand functions with positive and decreas-
ing marginal revenues, as stated below.
Lemma 1. Under VES demand satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the market maximizes aggregate
real revenue Me
∫ cd
0 Lu
′(q(c)) · q(c)dG subject to the resource constraint of the economy: L ≥
Me
{∫ cd
0 [cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
where cd is the cost cutoff from the market equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that decentralized profit maximization coincides with centralized revenue
maximization. The intuition is analogous to perfect competition where the economy can be sub-
divided into smaller replications which must reward factors identically and therefore maximize
revenues to pay factors identically. Here, free entry and additive utility across varieties imply that
if any fraction of labor is used by a subset of ex ante entrants who do not maximize revenue as a
group, then the total wage bill they could pay (equal to revenues) would be lower than for the same
fraction of labor elsewhere in the economy, violating labor market clearing.
This result shows that the market and optimal allocations are generally not aligned under VES
demand. The market and optimal allocations are solutions to:
max Me
∫ cd
0
u′(q(c)) ·q(c)dG where L≥Me
{∫ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
Market
max Me
∫ cd
0
u(q(c))dG where L≥Me
{∫ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
Optimum
For CES demand, u(q) = qρ while u′(q)q = ρqρ implying revenue maximization is perfectly
aligned with welfare maximization. The CES result is therefore a limiting case of allocations
under VES demand. Outside of CES, quantities produced by firms are too low or too high and
in general equilibrium, this implies that the productivity of operating firms is also too low or too
high. Market quantity, variety and productivity reflect the distortions of imperfect competition.
This leads us to an examination of the distribution of misallocations under VES demand.
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4 Market Distortions and Variable Elasticities
As discussed earlier, the market equilibrium has two externalities: the appropriability externality
measured by (1−ε(q)) and the business stealing externality measured by µ(q). When private and
social markups vary with quantity, these two externalities do not offset each other exactly and the
market misallocates resources. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) examine when the market induces optimal
entry in a world with symmetric firms, and find that the bias in market allocation is determined by
how the elasticity of utility varies with quantity (1− ε(q))′. When firms differ in productivity,
the business stealing effect varies across varieties, and we show that the inverse demand elasticity
µ ′(q) matters for the bias in market allocations.
To explain the misallocations, this Section starts with a discussion of the relationship between
markups and quantity (µ ′(q) and (1− ε(q))′). We then re-state the link between markup variation
and misallocations in a symmetric firm setting. Finally, we characterize how the market allocates
resources relative to the social optimum under firm heterogeneity, and discuss the robustness of
these results to different modelling assumptions.
4.1 Markup and Quantity Patterns
We will show that the relationship between markups and quantity characterizes distortions. When
µ ′(q) > 0, private markups are positively correlated with quantity. This is the case studied by
Krugman (1979): firms are able to charge higher markups when they sell higher quantities. Our
regularity conditions guarantee that low cost firms produce higher quantities (Section 3.1), so low
cost firms have both high q and high markups. When µ ′(q) < 0, small “boutique” firms charge
higher markups. Similarly, the sign of (1− ε(q))′ determines how social markups vary with quan-
tity. For CES demand, private and social markups are constant (µ ′ = 0, (1− ε)′ = 0).
The empirical relationship between markups and quantities is largely in line with increasing pri-
vate markups µ ′(q)> 0, though decreasing markups are also a theoretical possibility. De Loecker
et al. (2012); De Loecker and Warzynski (2012); Dhyne, Petrin, and Warzynski (2011) estimate
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markups from firm-level production data and find that markups are positively correlated with the
productivity of manufacturing firms, implying µ ′(q) > 0. A large literature infers markups from
the price responses to exchange rate fluctuations, and the studies also find evidence for µ ′(q) > 0
(Goldberg and Knetter 1997). In early work, Klette (1999) however shows that Norwegian firms
with higher markups tend to have lower productivity.14
The empirical literature largely finds increasing firm markups, but social markups are rarely
observable. We therefore discuss the theoretical implications of different signs for (1− ε)′. For
this purpose, it is useful to define preferences according to how private and social markups vary
with quantity. Definition 1 below characterizes preferences as aligned when private and social
markups move in the same direction.
Definition 1. Private and social incentives are aligned when µ ′ and (1− ε)′ have the same sign.
Commonly-used utility functions exhibit aligned preferences. For instance, (1−ε)′ > 0 when-
ever µ ′ > 0 in the HARA class. To fix these ideas, Table 1 summarizes µ ′ and (1− ε)′ for com-
monly used utility functions. Among the forms of u(q) considered are expo-power15, HARA16
and their special cases - CARA and quadratic preferences. Conversely, incentives are misaligned
when µ ′ and (1− ε)′ have different signs. There are reasons to believe that misaligned preferences
are less appealing for theoretical work. The most commonly used misaligned preferences are the
generalized Dixit-Stiglitz CES preferences u(q) = (q+α)ρ for α >−q but these preferences are
not continuous at zero when they are appropriately normalized to ensure u(0) = 0. It is also un-
clear whether well-behaved preferences can be misaligned across all quantity levels. Vives (2001)
shows aligned preferences also have the advantage that the elasticity of 1− ε equals the elasticity
of µ in the limit as q approaches zero under a relatively mild assumption. For these reasons, we
focus on the case of aligned preferences and especially on increasing private and social markups
14In a series of influential papers, Roberts and Supina (1996, 2001) show that six of the thirteen manufactured
products in their US data exhibit increasing price-cost margins, four products have decreasing price-cost margins and
two products show no significant variation. But these studies focus on products that are relatively homogeneous across
manufacturers, such as white pan bread and ready-mixed concrete.
15The expo-power utility was proposed by Saha (1993) and recently used by Holt and Laury (2002) and Post,
Van den Assem, Baltussen, and Thaler (2008) to model risk aversion empirically.
16The parameter restrictions are ρ ∈ (0,1) and α > q/(ρ−1) for HARA.
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which are empirically relevant.
4.2 Misallocations under Symmetric Firms
Dixit and Stiglitz examine how the market allocation deviates from the optimal allocation. They
find that the elasticity of utility determines the bias in production and entry. We state their result
below and discuss how productivity differences subsequently affect distortions.
Proposition 3. Under symmetric firms, the pattern of misallocation is as follows:
1. If (1− ε)′ < 0, market quantities are too high and market entry is too low.
2. If (1− ε)′ > 0, market quantities are too low and market entry is too high.
Proof. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Variation in the elasticity of utility summarizes the difference between the lack of appropriability
and business stealing because ε ′q/ε = 1− ε− µ . When (1− ε)′ > 0, the business stealing exter-
nality outweighs the appropriability externality. Firms ignore the negative effect of entry on prices
and the market provides too much variety. When (1− ε)′ < 0, the business stealing externality is
smaller and the market provides too little variety. Under symmetric firms, the two externalities are
the same across all firms and the variation in firm markups µ ′(q) does not affect the bias in market
allocations.
The symmetric firm case simplifies the analysis of misallocations as the tradeoff is between two
decisions: quantity and entry. In contrast, determining misallocations across heterogeneous firms
is less obvious because quantities vary by firm productivity, and this variation depends on entry
and selection. Furthermore, the business stealing effect varies across firms and depends on the
distribution of markups. The next sub-section explains these misallocations for heterogeneous
firms. Examining misallocations across the entire distribution of firms reveals two substantive
results. First, as we might expect, the misallocation of resources across firms differs by produc-
tivity. An interesting finding is that this heterogeneity in misallocation can be severe enough that
some firms over-produce while others under-produce. For example, as we will show below, when
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µ ′ > 0 and (1− ε)′ > 0, excess production by small firms imposes an externality on large firms.
Large firms produce below their optimal scale and too many small firms enter the market. In this
case, the market diverts resources away from large firms towards small firms. Second, accounting
for firm heterogeneity shows that both the elasticity of utility and the inverse demand elasticity
determine resource misallocations. When firms are symmetric, only the elasticity of utility de-
termines misallocations and the inverse demand elasticity does not matter (Proposition 3). The
presence of productivity differences across firms fundamentally changes the qualitative analysis.
When markups vary, firms with different productivity levels charge different markups and steal
business at different rates across firms. Therefore, firm heterogeneity and variable markups alter
the standard policy rules for correcting misallocation of resources.
4.3 Quantity, Selection and Entry Distortions
We now characterize the misallocations by demand characteristics. The distortions in quantity,
productivity and entry are discussed in turn. The distortions depend on both µ ′ and (1− ε)′, and
firm heterogeneity reveals new distortions in market outcomes.
4.3.1 Quantity Bias
Quantity distortions differ across firms, and whether firms over-produce or under-produce depends
on their productivity. The relationship between market and optimal quantities is fixed by FOCs for
revenue maximization and welfare maximization. The market chooses [1−µ(qmkt)]u′(qmkt) = δc,
while the optimal quantity is given by u′(qopt) = λc. Therefore, the relationship of market and
optimal quantities is
Firm MB
Social MB
=
[
1−µ (qmkt)] ·u′ (qmkt)
u′ (qopt)
=
δc
λc
=
Firm MC
Social MC
.
The ratio of real revenue to welfare δ/λ depends on entry, productivity and the distribution of
quantities. It summarizes the industry-wide distortions through the lack of appropriability and
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business stealing across all varieties. The variety-specific externality arises from different rates of
business stealing which is captured by µ(qmkt(c)).
When incentives are aligned, the gap between the market and social cost of resources (δ and
λ ) is small enough that quantities are not uniformly distorted across all firms. The variety-specific
business stealing effect can dominate the average appropriability and business stealing effects,
leading to differences in the quantity bias across firms. Quantities are equal for some c∗ where
1−µ (qmkt(c∗))= δ/λ . For all other varieties, quantities are still distorted. When µ ′,(1− ε)′> 0,
market production is biased towards high cost firms (qmkt < qopt for low c and qmkt > qopt for high
c). The market shifts business away from low cost firms and over-rewards high cost firms. When
µ ′,(1− ε)′ < 0, the bias is reversed and low cost firms over-produce. Therefore, when private and
social markups are aligned, whether the market under- or over- produces depends on a firm’s costs.
Proposition 4 summarizes the bias in market quantities.
Proposition 4. When preferences are aligned and infq ε (q)> 0, qmkt(c) and qopt(c) have a unique
crossing c∗ (perhaps beyond market and optimal cost cutoffs).
3. If (1− ε)′ > 0 and µ ′ > 0 , qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c < c∗ and qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c > c∗.
4. If (1− ε)′ < 0 and µ ′ < 0, qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c < c∗ and qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c > c∗.
4.3.2 Selection Bias
The distortion in firm selection is determined by the relation between the elasticity of utility and
quantity. Proposition 5 shows that market productivity is either too low or high, depending on
whether social markups are increasing or decreasing. We now use this result to depict the pattern
of misallocation graphically, and discuss the result further below.
Proposition 5. Market selection is too low or high, as follows:
1. If (1− ε)′ > 0, market selection is too low: cmktd > coptd .
2. If (1− ε)′ < 0, market selection is too high: cmktd < coptd .
While Proposition 5 follows from a general equilibrium analysis, the decision to introduce
a marginal variety can be intuitively explained as follows. Under increasing social markups
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(1− ε)′ > 0, the lack of appropriability of a marginal variety is lower than its business stealing
effect. This encourages production of the marginal variety, and the cost cutoff in the market is too
high. Although the marginal variety steals business at different rates across varieties, its impact on
reallocation of business across varieties is small and the bias in the cost cutoff is determined by the
elasticity of utility.
Propositions 4 and 5 show that the market misallocates resources across firms, and variable
demand elasticities characterize the pattern of these misallocations. Figure 1 illustrates the bias
in firm-level production for aligned preferences when markups increase in quantity. For ease of
reference, Table 2 summarizes the misallocations by demand characteristics.17
A comparison of the mass of entrants in the market and the optimum is generally hard to make.
Unlike the marginal variety, entry has sizable business stealing effects. The two externalities of
appropriability and business stealing move in opposite directions, and the bias in potential entry Me
and available variety MeG(cd) cannot be determined without further information on demand and
cost parameters. The net effect of the externalities depends on the relative magnitudes of demand
and cost parameters including the cost distribution G(c). For instance, Nocco, Ottaviano, and Salto
(2013) find that the mass of firms cannot be unambiguously ranked even when demand is linear
and the cost distribution is Pareto. While firm heterogeneity makes entry distortions dependent on
the cost distribution, the bias in quantity and selection can be unambiguously inferred from the
demand-side elasticities.
4.4 Extensions of the Basic Framework
As many different fields of economics (such as macroeconomics and urban economics) use monop-
olistically competitive models, we extend our basic framework to different modelling assumptions
17Table 2 characterizes the qualitative role of demand elasticities in misallocations. Using a quantitative measure
of distortions reiterates their importance. The loss from misallocations can be summarized by the difference between
social and market “profits”, evaluated at optimal allocations. This measure consists of the difference between average
social markup and average private markup (1− ε¯− µ¯), and the covariance between social and private markups Cov(1−
ε,µ). The covariance component shows that the distribution of markups matters for quantifying distortions, except
when firms are symmetric or markups are constant (leading to zero covariance).
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used in these fields to discuss the robustness of CES efficiency and misallocations under VES
demand.
The main finding is that allowing the costs of production of a variety to vary with its scale of
production does not change the market distortion results of Sections 3 and 4. To account for non-
constant marginal costs, let the variable cost of production be ω(q) ·cq and assume 2ω ′+ω ′′q > 0
for all feasible quantities to ensure strict concavity of the firm problem. The market maximizes
aggregate revenue under non-constant marginal costs. As firms account for the interdependence
between their unit costs and quantity, CES demand ensures the same tradeoff between different
externalities and leads to efficient allocations (as shown in an online Appendix). Under VES
demand, the bias in quantity and selection are the same as Propositions 4 and 5.
Relegating details to an online Appendix, we note that the market distortion results are robust
to three other extensions. Allowing for multiple sectors as in Zhelobodko et al. (2012), the market
distortion results are valid for a given level of resource allocation to the differentiated goods sector.
Furthermore, the results are robust to a firm-specific advertising technology as in Arkolakis (2010)
and to the CES-Benassy class of preferences (Benassy (1996), Alessandria and Choi (2007)).
5 Efficiency and Market Size
Having discussed misallocations, this Section examines gains in welfare and efficiency from inte-
gration with world markets. The existence of gains from international trade is one of the “most
fundamental results” in economics (Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013)). Increases in market
size encourage competition, so we might expect that integration would reduce market power and
improve welfare. However, the following insight of Helpman and Krugman (1985) (pp. 179) is
relevant:
“Unfortunately imperfect competition, even if takes as sanitized a form as monopo-
listic competition, does not lead the economy to an optimum. As a result there is no
guarantee that expanding the economy’s opportunities, through trade or anything else,
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necessarily leads to a gain. We cannot prove in general that countries gain from trade
in the differentiated products model.”
Building on this insight, we address two related questions. First, we examine when market expan-
sion provides welfare gains, and show that welfare gains are related to the demand-side elasticities
mentioned earlier. Next, we discuss the role of firm heterogeneity and variable elasticities for
quantitative work measuring the welfare gains from international trade.
5.1 Integration, Market Size and Efficiency
We begin with the equivalence between market expansion and trade. Echoing Krugman (1979), an
economy can increase its market size by opening to trade with foreign markets. A VES economy
of size L1 that trades freely with countries of sizes L2, ...,Ln has the same market equilibrium as
a single autarkic VES economy of size L = L1 + ...+ Ln. Consequently, the market distortions
detailed in Section 5 persist in integrated markets. Resource allocation in an integrated market is
suboptimal, except under CES demand. When markups vary, marginal revenues do not correspond
to marginal utilities so market allocations are not aligned with efficient allocations. This is partic-
ularly important when considering trade as a policy option, as it implies that opening to trade may
take the economy further from the social optimum. For example, market expansion from trade
may induce the exit of low productivity firms from the market when it is optimal to keep more low
productivity firms with the purpose of preserving variety.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) provide sufficient conditions for welfare gains from trade. They
show that when productivity and variety do not decline after integration, then there are gains from
trade.18 In terms of primitives, we find that integration is always beneficial when preferences are
aligned. This is true for any cost distribution, but requires a regularity condition for decreasing
private markups ((µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))′ ≤ 0). The regularity condition ensures that the marginal
revenue is convex whenever firm markups are decreasing in quantity. As market size expands, this
18Specifically, let w denote the wage and C(w,q) = w(c+ f/q) denote the average unit cost function for producing
q units of variety c. When firms are symmetric in c, trade is beneficial as long as variety does not fall (Me ≥Maute )
and average unit cost of the autarky bundle is lower (C(w,q) ·qaut ≤C(w,qaut) ·qaut).
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implies that the rise in markups from lower per capita quantity is not high enough for firms to scale
back on the total quantity that they sell to all consumers in the bigger market. We summarize this
in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Market expansion increases welfare when preferences are aligned. (Provided
(µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))′ ≤ 0 whenever µ ′ < 0).
The economic reasoning for Proposition 6 follows from similar responses of the two demand-side
elasticities to changes in quantity. An increase in market size increases competition and reduces per
capita demand for each variety. When preferences are aligned, demand shifts change the private
and social markups in the same direction. The market therefore incentivizes firms towards the
right allocation and provides higher welfare. Building on this result, Bykadorov et al. (2015) show
that aligned preferences are necessary and sufficient for welfare gains from trade under symmetric
firms and variable marginal costs.
The role of aligned markups in firm survival highlights how trade increases welfare. When
aligned markups increase with quantity, a rise in market size forces out the least productive firms.
Since social markups are positively correlated with quantity, the least productive firms also con-
tribute relatively little to welfare and their exit is beneficial. When markups decrease with quantity,
small “boutique” firms contribute to welfare at a higher rate and are also able to survive after in-
tegration by charging higher markups. Integration enables the market to adapt their production in
line with social incentives, leading to welfare gains from trade.
5.2 Quantitative Literature on Welfare Gains from Trade
A growing body of work seeks to quantify the welfare gains from trade. New quantitative trade
models typically estimate the gains from trade under CES demand. In an influential paper, Arko-
lakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) show that welfare in a model with heterogeneous firms
can be summarized by two sufficient statistics: the share of expenditure on domestically produced
goods and the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs. As these sufficient statistics are com-
mon to heterogeneous and representative firm models, welfare gains estimated from import shares
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and constant trade elasticities using trade data are the same across heterogeneous and representa-
tive firm models. However, the two models only deliver the same estimates for welfare gains when
the underlying structural parameters for preferences and technology differ across the models. We
use this insight of Melitz and Redding (2013) to explain the relevance of our optimality results for
the quantitative literature on the gains from trade.
Melitz and Redding find that the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz provides quantitatively
higher gains from trade than an equivalent representative firm model when the structural parame-
ters are the same across these models. As they mention, this can be understood by appealing to the
social optimality results for CES demand (Proposition 1). Consider initial equilibria in the hetero-
geneous and homogeneous firm models that feature identical aggregate statistics and welfare. In
the homogeneous firm model, the unit cost of production is exogenously fixed, and hence remains
unchanged when the economy opens to trade. In the heterogeneous firm model, the cost distri-
bution changes when the economy opens to trade. In a companion note, we show that the open
economy equilibrium with trade frictions is efficient under CES demand (Dhingra and Morrow
2016a). Since the policymaker chooses to change the cost cutoff in an open economy, the open
economy market allocation must yield higher welfare than any other feasible allocation (where the
unit cost is unchanged). The allocation where the unit cost does not change is identical to the open
economy equilibrium in the homogeneous firm model. Therefore the open economy equilibrium
in the heterogeneous firm model must yield higher welfare than the open economy equilibrium in
the homogeneous firm model. This shows that a quantitative trade model with the same structural
parameters across models will provide higher welfare gains in a setting with firm heterogeneity.
The optimality of market allocations ensures that firm heterogeneity increases the magnitude of
the welfare gains from trade.
Departing from CES preferences, market allocations are no longer optimal. This raises the
question of the role played by firm heterogeneity in altering the magnitude of welfare gains from
trade. While we do not model trade costs, Proposition 6 shows that market expansion through trade
provides higher welfare gains when firms differ in productivity. Under aligned preferences and the
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regularity condition, we show models with firm heterogeneity and increasing markups provide
higher welfare gains from trade than representative firm models.
For a given change in real income, the welfare gains from trade depend on the different assump-
tions on demand and firm costs. Welfare is U = Me
∫
u(q)dG = δ/ε¯ where the average elasticity
of utility is ε¯ ≡ ∫ εudG/∫ udG. An increase in market size increases real income at the rate of the
average markup (d lnδ/d lnL =
∫
µ pqdG/
∫
pqdG ≡ µ˜). The change in average elasticity can be
decomposed into the change in ε(q) given u/
∫
udG, and the change in the weights u/
∫
udG. Let
xd ≡ x(q(cd)), then the change in the average elasticity of utility is
d ln ε¯
d lnL
=
∫ ε ′u
ε¯
∫
udG
d lnq
d lnL
dG+
∫ u′ε−u′ε¯
ε¯
∫
udG
d lnq
d lnL
dG+
ud
ε¯
∫
udG
(εd− ε¯)cdg(cd)d lncdd lnL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reallocation across heterogeneous firms
.
The first term is the change in the elasticity of utility due to a fall in quantity per firm, holding fixed
the share of each variety in the average elasticity. The second and third terms denote the change
in the average elasticity of utility due to a reallocation of resources across heterogeneous firms.
Reallocation of resources across firms changes the share of each variety in the average elasticity of
utility through
(
u(q)/
∫ cd
0 u(q)dG
)′. Using this decomposition, we can explain the role of variable
elasticities and firm heterogeneity in welfare gains from trade.
For a given change in real income (d lnδ/d lnL = µ˜), we decompose the gains from trade
into gains for a representative firm and gains due to differences in firm productivity. Defining the
market outcome of a representative firm as the revenue-weighted average of heterogeneous firms,
the gains from trade for a given change in real income are:
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d lnU
d lnL
= µ˜
∫ 1− ε
µ
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
CES
+ µ˜
∫ (1− ε+µ ′q/(1−µ)
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ) −
1− ε
µ
)
εu∫
εudG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
VES & Representative Firm
+ µ˜
∫ ε− ε¯
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ)
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quantity Reallocation
+
ud∫
udG
cdg(cd)
ε¯(1−µd)(εd− ε¯)(µ˜−µd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm Selection
The first line contains the gains from trade for a representative firm. The first component is the
welfare gain when firm markups are constant and the second component shows how welfare gains
change when markups vary with quantity. Under CES demand, the welfare gain is the revenue-
weighted average of 1− ε . VES demand adds the second component which is positive when
markups are increasing and negative when markups are decreasing with quantity.
The second line consists of the gains from trade arising due to differences in firm productivity.
The first component of the second line is the welfare gain from changes in relative quantities
across firms. When firms differ in productivity, market size affects their output levels differently
and resources are reallocated across firms. For aligned preferences, quantity reallocation increases
the welfare gains from trade under the regularity condition. The second component shows the
welfare gains from firm selection. Aligned preferences ensure the market selects the right firms as
it expands and leads to higher welfare gains. We summarize this in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Under aligned preferences, the welfare gains from market expansion are higher in
heterogeneous firm models, compared to representative firm models provided (µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))′≤
0 whenever µ ′ < 0.
When preferences are aligned, the reallocation of resources across heterogeneous firms pro-
vides another channel for welfare gains from integration. As most empirical studies are con-
sistent with increasing markups (µ ′ > 0), structural estimates based on CES demand therefore
provide a lower bound (1− ε˜) for the potential gains from trade. For a given change in real in-
come, accounting for firm heterogeneity and increasing markups would reveal higher welfare gains
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from trade. The magnitude of these additional gains depends on the markup variation (through
ε(q(c))− ε(q(cd)) and µ ′(q(c))) and on the productivity distribution (through g(cd)).
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the efficiency of market allocations when firms vary in productivity and
markups. Considering the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the efficiency of CES demand is valid
even with productivity differences across firms. This is because market outcomes maximize rev-
enue, and under CES demand, private and social incentives are perfectly aligned.
Generalizing to variable elasticities of substitution, firms differ in market power which affects
the trade-off between quantity, variety and productivity. Unlike symmetric firm models, the mar-
ket distortions depend on the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of utility. Under CES demand,
these two elasticities are constant and miss out on meaningful trade-offs. When these elasticities
vary, the pattern of misallocations depends on how demand elasticities change with quantities, so
policy analysis should ascertain these elasticities and take this information into account. While
the modeling framework we consider provides a theoretical starting point to understand distortions
across firms, enriching the model with market-specific features can yield better policy insights.
Neary and Mrazova (2013) and Parenti, Ushchev, and Thisse (2017) provide further generaliza-
tions of demand and costs, and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2006) and Opp, Parlour, and Walden
(2013) consider dynamic misallocations. Future work can also provide guidance on the design of
implementable policies to realize further welfare gains.
We focus on international integration as a key policy tool to realize potential gains. Market
expansion does not guarantee welfare gains under imperfect competition. As Dixit and Norman
(1988) put it, this may seem like a “sad note” on which to end. But we find that integration
provides welfare gains when the two demand-side elasticities ensure private and social incentives
are aligned. The welfare gains from integration are higher than those obtained in representative
firm models with constant elasticities, because market expansion also leads to a better reallocation
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of resources across heterogeneous firms. Further work might quantify the scope of integration as a
tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 A Folk Theorem
In this context, we need to define the policy space. Provided Me and q(c), and assuming without
loss of generality that all of q(c) is consumed, allocations are determined. The only question
remaining is what class of q(c) the policymaker is allowed to choose from. A sufficiently rich class
for our purposes is q(c), which are positive and continuously differentiable on some closed interval
and zero otherwise. This follows from the basic principle that a policymaker will utilize low
cost firms before higher cost firms. Proposition 1 shows without loss of generality that quantities
produced at the market equilibrium are continuously differentiable. So we restrict q to be in sets
of the form
Q[0,cd ] ≡ {q ∈ C 1,> 0 on [0,cd] and 0 otherwise}.
We use the following shorthand throughout the proofs: G(x)≡ ∫ x0 g(c)dc, R(x)≡ ∫ x0 cρ/(ρ−1)g(c)dc.
Proof of Proposition 1. Our assumptions imply the existence of a unique market equilibrium,
which guarantees that R(c) is finite for admissible c. First note that at both the market equilibrium
and the social optimum, L/Me = fe + f G(cd) implies utility of zero, so in both cases L/Me >
fe+ f G(cd). The policymaker’s problem is
max MeL
∫ cd
0
q(c)ρg(c)dc subject to fe+ f G(cd)+L
∫ cd
0
cq(c)g(c)dc = L/Me
where the maximum is taken over choices of Me, cd, q∈Q[0,cd ]. We will exhibit a globally optimal
q∗(c) for each fixed (Me,cd) pair, reducing the policymaker’s problem to a choice of Me and cd .
We then solve for Me as a function of cd and finally solve for cd .
Finding q∗(c) for Me,cd fixed. For convenience, define the functionals V (q),H(q) by
V (q)≡ L
∫ cd
0
v(c,q(c))dc, H(q)≡ L
∫ cd
0
h(c,q(c))dc
where h(c,x)≡ xcg(c) and v(c,x)≡ xρg(c). One may show that V (q)−λH(q) is strictly concave
∀λ .19 Now for fixed (Me,cd), consider the problem of finding q∗ given by
max
q∈Q[0,cd ]
V (q) subject to H(q) = L/Me− fe− f G(cd). (2)
Following Troutman (1996), if some q∗ maximizes V (q)−λH(q) onQ[0,cd ] for some λ and satis-
19Since h is linear in x, H is linear and since v is strictly concave in x (using ρ < 1) so is V .
32
fies the constraint then it is a solution to Equation (2). For any λ , a sufficient condition for some
q∗ to be a global maximum ofQ[0,cd ] is
D2v(c,q∗(c)) = λD2h(c,q∗(c)). (3)
This follows because (3) implies for any such q∗, ∀ξ s.t. q∗+ ξ ∈Q[0,cd ] we have δV (q∗;ξ ) =
λδH(q∗;ξ ) (where δ denotes the Gateaux derivative in the direction of ξ ) and q∗ is a global max
since V (q)−λH(q) is strictly concave. Condition (3) is ρq∗(c)ρ−1g(c) = λcg(c), which implies
q∗(c) = (λc/ρ)1/(ρ−1).20 From above, this q∗ serves as a solution to maxV (q) provided that
H(q∗) = L/Me− fe− f G(cd). This will be satisfied by an appropriate λ since for fixed λ we have
H(q∗) = L
∫ cd
0
(λc/ρ)1/(ρ−1)cg(c)dc = L(λ/ρ)1/(ρ−1)R(cd)
so choosing λ as λ ∗ ≡ ρ (L/Me− fe− f G(cd))ρ−1 /Lρ−1R(cd)ρ−1 makes q∗ a solution. In sum-
mary, for each (Me,cd) a globally optimal q∗ satisfying the resource constraint is
q∗(c) = c1/(ρ−1) (L/Me− fe− f G(cd))/LR(cd) (4)
which must be > 0 since L/Me− fe− f G(cd) must be > 0 as discussed at the beginning.
Finding Me for cd fixed. We may therefore consider maximizing W (Me,cd) where
W (Me,cd)≡MeL
∫ cd
0
q∗(c)ρg(c)dc = MeL1−ρ [L/Me− fe− f G(cd)]ρR(cd)1−ρ . (5)
Direct investigation yields a unique solution to the FOC of M∗e (cd) = (1−ρ)L/( fe+ f G(cd)) and
d2W/d2Me < 0 so this solution maximizes W .
Finding cd . Finally, we have maximal welfare for each fixed cd from Equation (5), explicitly
W˜ (cd) ≡W (M∗e (cd),cd). We may rule out cd = 0 as an optimum since this yields zero utility.
Solving this expression and taking logs shows that
lnW˜ (cd) = lnρρ(1−ρ)1−ρL2−ρ +(1−ρ) [lnR(cd)− ln( fe+ f G(cd))] .
Defining B(cd)≡ lnR(cd)− ln( fe+ f G(cd)) we see that to maximize lnW˜ (cd) we need maximize
only B(cd). In order to evaluate critical points of B, note that differentiating B and rearranging
20By abuse of notation we allow q∗ to be ∞ at c = 0 since reformulation of the problem omitting this single point
makes no difference to allocations or utility which are all eventually integrated.
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using R′(cd) = c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d g(cd) yields
B′(cd) =
{
cρ/(ρ−1)d −R(cd) f/ [ fe+ f G(cd)]
}
/g(cd)R(cd). (6)
Since limcd−→0 c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d =∞ and limcd−→∞ c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d = 0 while R(cd) and G(cd) are bounded, there
is a positive interval [a,b] outside of which B′(x) > 0 for x ≤ a and B′(x) < 0 for x ≥ b. Clearly
supx∈(0,a]B(x),supx∈[b,∞)B(x) < supx∈[a,b]B(x) and therefore any global maximum of B occurs in
(a,b). Since B is continuously differentiable, a maximum exists in [a,b] and all maxima occur at
critical points of B. From Equation (6), B′(cd) = 0 iff R(cd)/c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d −G(cd) = fe/ f . For cd that
satisfy B′(cd) = 0, M∗e and q∗ are determined and inspection shows the entire system corresponds
to the market allocation. Therefore B has a unique critical point, which is a global maximum that
maximizes welfare.
A.2 VES Market Allocation
Proof of Lemma 1. Define feasible aggregate real revenues for (Me,cd,q(c)) that satisfy the
resource constraint by R (Me,cd,q(c))≡Me
∫ cd
0 Lu
′ (q(c))q(c)dG. First note that R is bounded.
This follows from Assumption 3 by the following argument. Fix
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
and define q̂(c) by
u′′ (q̂(c)) q̂(c)+u′ (q̂(c)) = u′ (q̂(c)) [1−µ (q̂(c))] = δ̂
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
· c (7)
where δ̂
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
is the infinimum of such δ̂ that satisfy the resource constraint (so that it exactly
holds). By Assumption 1.2 there is an m ∈ (0,1) such that (for the analogue pi (c) of the profit
expression for the market)
L
(
u′ (q̂(c))/δ̂
)
q̂(c) = pi (c)+ f +Lcq̂(c)≤ 1
m
Lcq̂(c) .
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Therefore aggregate real revenues at q̂(c) are bounded as:
R
(
M̂e, ĉd, q̂(c)
)
= δ̂M̂e
∫ ĉd
0
L
(
u′ (q̂(c))/δ̂
)
q̂(c)dG
≤ δ̂ M̂e
m
∫ ĉd
0
Lcq̂(c)dG
= δ̂
M̂e
m
∫ ĉd
0
Lc
(
u′
)−1( δ̂c
1−µ (q̂(c))
)
dG
≤ δ̂
m
L2
fe
∫ ∞
0
c
(
u′
)−1( δ̂c
1−m
)
dG
=
1−m
m
L2
fe
∫ ∞
0
c
(
u′
)−1
(c)dG (8)
where the second to last line follows from Assumption 1.2 and M̂e ≤ L/ fe (from the resource
constraint), while the last by a change of variable in the integrand. Assumption 3.2 implies the last
line, 8, is finite.
We will now show that R
(
M̂e, ĉd, ·
)
is bounded for quantity distributions that satisfy the re-
source constraint. Let q(c) satisfy the resource constraint at
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
, so that since
∫ ĉd
0 Lcq(c)dG<
∞, it follows that G({c : cq(c) = ∞}) = 0. Since G is absolutely continuous, G({c : c = 0}) =
0 and therefore G({c : q(c) = ∞}) ≤ G({c : cq(c) = ∞}) +G({c : c = 0}) = 0, i.e. q(c) is
bounded almost everywhere and similarly q̂(c). Thus, for almost every c, there is a γ (c) ∈ [0,1]
such that for qξ (c)≡ ξq(c)+(1−ξ ) q̂(c), by the mean value theorem
u′ (q(c))q(c)−u′ (q̂(c)) q̂(c) = u′ (qγ(c))(1−µ (qγ(c)))(q(c)− q̂(c)) .
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Appealing to this identity, we have for indicator function 1A (x) = 1 if x ∈ A and 0 otherwise,
R
(
M̂e, ĉd,q(c)
)
−R
(
M̂e, ĉd, q̂(c)
)
= M̂eL
∫ ĉd
0
[
u′ (q(c))q(c)−u′ (q̂(c)) q̂(c)]dG
= M̂eL
∫ ĉd
0
u′
(
qγ(c)
)(
1−µ (qγ(c)))(q(c)− q̂(c))dG
≤ L
2
fe
∫ ĉd
0
u′
(
qγ(c)
)
(1−m)(q(c)− q̂(c))dG
≤ L
2
fe
∫ ĉd
0
u′
(
qγ(c)
)
(1−m)(q(c)− q̂(c))1q(c)>q̂(c) (c)dG
≤ L
2
fe
∫ ĉd
0
u′ (q̂(c))(1−m)(q(c)− q̂(c))1q(c)>q̂(c) (c)dG
=
L2
fe
∫ ĉd
0
δ̂c(1−m)
1−µ (q̂(c)) (q(c)− q̂(c))1q(c)>q̂(c) (c)dG
= δ̂
L2
fe
∫ ĉd
0
c(1−m)
m
(q(c)− q̂(c))1q(c)>q̂(c) (c)dG
≤ δ̂ L
2
fe
∫ ĉd
0
(1−m)
m
cq(c)dG
where the third line follows from M̂e ≤ L/ fe and µ ≤ m, the fifth from u′′ < 0, the sixth from
u′ (q̂(c)) = δ̂c/(1−µ (q̂(c))) and the seventh from µ ≥ 1−m. Finally the last term is finite
because q(c) satisfies the resource constraint.
Since for any fixed pair
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
we know R
(
M̂e, ĉd, ·
)
is bounded by, say B
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
, the
positive and convex problem of minimizing B
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
−R
(
M̂e, ĉd, ·
)
then satisfies the sufficient
conditions for an optimum exactly at q̂(c) with constraint multiplier δ̂
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
. Consequently,
Equation (8) is an upper bound for R. This also implies the maximal aggregate revenue possible
may be found by evaluating
R
(
M̂e, ĉd
)
≡R
(
M̂e, ĉd, q̂(c)
)
+ δ̂
(
M̂e, ĉd
)[
L− M̂e
(∫ ĉd
0
(Lcq̂(c)+ f )dG(c)+ fe
)]
onD ≡ [0,L/ fe]× [0,∞), on which R is continuously differentiable and since G−1 ([0,∞)) = [0,1],
has at least one maximum
(
M∗e ,c∗d
)
, which by above is finite. Clearly M∗e ∈ {0,L/ fe} implies
zero revenues, and trivially there is some R > 0 for which R
(
M∗e ,c∗d
)≥ R so M∗e ∈ (0,L/ fe). The
envelope theorem applied to dR/dMe at M∗e then implies (with ∗ denoting the revel ant maximizing
terms):
δ ∗ (M∗e ,c
∗
d) =
∫ c∗d
0
u′ (q∗ (c))q∗ (c)dG/
(∫ c∗d
0
[
cq∗ (c)+
f
L
]
dG+
fe
L
)
=
R
(
M∗e ,c∗d
)
L
(9)
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and thus δ ∗ ≥ R/L. Now consider that c∗d = 0 implies zero revenues so c∗d > 0 and at any positive,
finite ĉd:
dR/dcd = M̂eL
[
u′ (q̂(ĉd)) q̂(ĉd)− δ̂ (ĉd q̂(ĉd)+ f/L)
]
= M̂eLδ̂
[
µ (ĉd)
1−µ (ĉd) ĉd q̂(ĉd)− f/L
]
.
It follows that if ĉd q̂(ĉd)< m/(1−m) · f/L, then dR/dcd < 0. In particular,
ĉd q̂(ĉd) = u′ (q̂(ĉd)) q̂(ĉd)(1−µ (q̂(ĉd)))/δ̂ ≤ u′ (q̂(ĉd)) q̂(ĉd)(1−m)/(R/L) . (10)
Since δ̂ is increasing in ĉd (from the resource constraint), δ̂ ĉd is increasing in ĉd and goes to infinity
as ĉd does, which implies q̂(ĉd) goes to zero as ĉd goes to infinity. Since limq−→0 u′ (q)q = 0, this
implies ĉd q̂(ĉd) −→ 0 as ĉd −→ 0 through Equation (10). Therefore for all sufficiently large ĉd ,
dR/dcd < 0 so it must be that c∗d is finite. By the envelope theorem, at c
∗
d , it must be that
u′ (q∗ (c∗d))q
∗ (c∗d) = δ
∗ (c∗dq
∗ (c∗d)+ f/L) . (11)
Now consider the equations that uniquely fix (Me,cd,q(c)) in the market allocation, namely:
u′ (q(cd))q(cd)/(cdq(cd)+ f/L) = δ ,∫ cd
0
u′ (q(c))q(c)dG/
(∫ cd
0
[cq(c)+ f/L]dG+ fe/L
)
= δ ,
u′′ (q(c))q(c)+u′ (q(c)) = δc,
Me
(∫ cd
0
Lcq(c)+ f dG+ fe
)
= L.
The first line is Equation (11), while the second is Equation (9), the third is Equation (7) and the
fourth holds from the definition of δ ∗. Since these conditions completely characterize every market
equilibrium, the uniqueness of the market equilibrium guarantees a unique solution here as well.
A.3 Static Distortion Results
Proof of Proposition 4. The result relies on the following relationship we first prove:
σ ≡ sup
c≤cmktd
ε
(
qmkt(c)
)
> δ/λ> inf
c≤coptd
ε
(
qopt(c)
)≡ σ . (12)
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To see this recall δ = Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0 u
′ (qmkt(c))qmkt(c)dG so σ > δ/λ because
δ/σ = Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0
(
ε
(
qmkt(c)
)
/σ
)
u
(
qmkt(c)
)
dG < Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0
u
(
qmkt(c)
)
dG (13)
and λ is the maximum welfare per capita so λ > Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0 u
(
qmkt(c)
)
dG > δ/σ . A similar
argument shows λσ < δ , giving Equation (12). Now note that[
u′′
(
qmkt(c)
)
qmkt(c)+u′
(
qmkt(c)
)]
/δ = c, u′
(
qopt(c)
)
/λ = c. (14)
And it follows from Equations (14) we have[
1−µ
(
qmkt(c)
)]
·u′
(
qmkt(c)
)
/u′
(
qopt(c)
)
= δ/λ . (15)
When µ ′ and ε ′ have different signs, and since infq ε (q) > 0, from above in both cases it holds
that infq>0 1−µ (q) = infq>0 ε (q) and supq>0 1−µ (q) = supq>0 ε (q). The arguments above have
shown that supq>0ε (q)> δ/λ > infq>0 ε (q) and therefore
supq>01−µ (q)> δ/λ > infq>01−µ (q) .
It follows from Equation (15) that for some c∗, 1−µ (qmkt(c∗))= δ/λ and therefore u′ (qmkt(c∗))=
u′ (qopt(c∗)) so qmkt(c∗) = qopt(c∗). Furthermore, qmkt(c) is strictly decreasing in c so with µ ′ 6= 0,
c∗ is unique. Returning to Equation (15), using the fact that qmkt(c) is strictly decreasing in c also
shows the relative magnitudes of qmkt(c) and qopt(c) for c 6= c∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. For α ∈ [0,1], define vα(q) ≡ αu′ (q)q+(1−α)u(q) and also define
w(q)≡ u′ (q)q−u(q) so vα (q) = u(q)+αw(q). Consider the continuum of maximization prob-
lems (indexed by α) defined as:
max
Me,cd ,q(c)
LMe
∫ cd
0
vα (q(c))dG subject to L≥Me
(∫ cd
0
Lcq(c)+ f dG+ fe
)
. (16)
Let the Lagrange multiplier associated with each α in Equation (16) be written as β (α). By ap-
pealing to the envelope theorem and differentiating (16) in Me we have β (α) =Me
∫ cd
0 vα (q(c))dG
and that dβ/dα = Me
∫ cd
0 w(q(c))dG = Me
∫ cd
0 u(q(c)) [ε(q)−1]dG < 0. The conditions charac-
terizing the solution to every optimum also imply
β (α) = vα (q(cd))/(cdq(cd)+ f/L) ,
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whereby we arrive at
dvα (q(cd))/dα = (dβ/dα)(vα (q(cd))/β )+β ((dcd/dα)q(cd)+ cd (dq(cd)/dα))
= w(q(cd))+ v′α (q(cd))(dq(cd)/dα)
= w(q(cd))+βcd (dq(cd)/dα)
so cancellation and rearrangement, using the expressions for β , dβ/dα above shows
βq(cd)(dcd/dα) = w(q(cd))− (vα (q(cd))/β )(dβ/dα)
= w(q(cd))−
(
vα (q(cd))/Me
∫ cd
0
vα (q(c))dG
)
·Me
∫ cd
0
w(q(c))dG.
We conclude that dcd/dα ≷ 0 when w(q(cd))
∫ cd
0 vα (q(c))dG ≷ vα (q(cd))
∫ cd
0 w(q(c))dG. Ex-
panding this inequality we have (suppressing q(c) terms in integrands):
w(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
udG+αw(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
wdG≷ u(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
wdG+αw(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
wdG.
Cancellation and expansion again show this is equivalent to
u′ (q(cd))q(cd)
∫ cd
0
udG≷ u(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
u′q(c)dG.
Finally, this expression can be rewritten ε (q(cd)) ≷
∫ cd
0 ε (q(c))u(q(c))dG/
∫ cd
0 u(q(c))dG and
since q(c) is strictly decreasing in c, we see dcd/dα ≷ 0 when ε ′ ≶ 0. Note that Equation (16)
shows α = 0 corresponds to the social optimum while α = 1 corresponds to the market equilib-
rium. It follows that when ε ′ < 0 that dcd/dα > 0 so we have cmktd > c
opt
d and vice versa for ε
′ > 0.
A.4 Welfare Gains from Trade
The sufficient condition for gains from trade follows from differentiating U = Me
∫
u(q)dG = δ/ε¯
where the average elasticity of utility is ε¯ ≡ ∫ εudG/∫ udG. An increase in market size raises the
marginal utility of income at the rate of average markups d lnδ/d lnL =
∫
µ pqdG/
∫
pqdG ≡ µ˜ .
From d lnδ/d lnL and d ln ε¯/d lnL, the change in welfare is
d lnU
d lnL
= µ˜
[
1+
∫ 1−µ− ε¯
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ)
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG
]
+
[
ud∫
udG
cdg(cd)
ε¯(1−µd)(εd− ε¯)(µ˜−µd)
]
.
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When preferences are aligned, the second term in square brackets is positive because µ and (1−ε)
move in the same direction. The first term in square brackets is also positive when preferences are
aligned, given the regularity condition that (µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))′ ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Following the discussion above, it is sufficient to show that for γ ≡
ε (µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))−1,
1+
∫ 1−µ− ε¯
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ)
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG =
∫ [
1− ε¯+µ ′q/(1−µ)] γu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG≥ 0. (17)
This clearly holds for µ ′ ≥ 0, and for the other case where preferences are aligned, we have µ ′ <
0 < ε ′. Expanding Equation (17) for γ¯ ≡ ∫ γ · (u/∫ udG)dG shows that∫ [
1− ε¯+µ ′q/(1−µ)] γu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG =[1− ε¯−µ] γ¯/ε¯+1+
∫
[µ−µ] γu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG.
Since ε ′ > 0, 1− ε − µ > 0 and [1− ε¯−µ] γ¯/ε¯ > 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that 1+∫
[µ−µ] γuε¯ ∫ udGdG > 0. This sufficient condition is equivalent to∫
(µ+ ε)
u∫
udG
dG≥
∫
µ
γu
γ¯
∫
udG
dG (18)
Since
∫
γ · (u/γ¯ ∫ udG)dG = 1 and dµ/dc > 0, it follows that if dγ/dc < 0, then Equation (18)
holds by stochastic dominance. As dγ/dc < 0 iff dγ/dq > 0, and ε ′ ≥ 0, it is sufficient that
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ) is decreasing in q , which is true by assumption.
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Tables
Table 1: Private and Social Markups for Common Utility Forms
(1− ε)′ ,µ ′ < 0 (1− ε)′ ,µ ′ > 0
HARA (α < 0): (q/(1−ρ)+α)
ρ−αρ
ρ/(1−ρ) HARA (α > 0):
(q/(1−ρ)+α)ρ−αρ
ρ/(1−ρ)
Expo-power (α < 0): 1−exp(−αq
1−ρ)
α Expo-power (α > 0):
1−exp(−αq1−ρ)
α
CARA, Quadratic
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Table 2: Distortions for Aligned Preferences by Demand Elasticities
Increasing Markups Decreasing Markups
µ ′,(1− ε)′ > 0 µ ′,(1− ε)′ < 0
Quantities High-Cost Skewed: Quantities Low-Cost Skewed:
qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c < c∗ qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c < c∗
qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c > c∗ qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c > c∗
Productivity Too Low: cmktd > c
opt
d Productivity Too High: c
mkt
d < c
opt
d
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Figure Legends
Figure 1: Bias in Firm Production for Aligned Preferences with Increasing Markups
µ ′,(1− ε)′ > 0
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